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Summary 
The term “pay gap” refers to the difference in earnings between male and female workers. While 
the pay gap has narrowed since the 1960s, female workers with a strong attachment to the labor 
force earn about 77 to 81 cents for every dollar earned by similar male workers. Studies have 
analyzed the earnings and characteristics of male and female workers and found that a substantial 
portion of the pay gap is attributable to non-gender factors such as occupation and employment 
tenure. Some interpret these studies as evidence that discrimination, if present at all, is a minor 
factor in the pay gap and conclude that no policy changes are necessary. Conversely, advocates 
for further policy interventions note that some of the explanatory factors of the pay gap (such as 
occupation and hours worked) could be the result of discrimination and that no broadly accepted 
methodology is able to attribute the entirety of the pay gap to non-gender factors. 
The Equal Pay Act (EPA), which amends the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), prohibits covered 
employers from paying lower wages to female employees than male employees for “equal work” 
on jobs requiring “equal skill, effort, and responsibility” and performed “under similar working 
conditions” at the same location. The FLSA exempts some jobs (e.g., hotel service workers) from 
EPA coverage, and the EPA makes exceptions for wage differentials based on merit or seniority 
systems, systems that measure earnings by “quality or quantity” of production, or “any factor 
other than sex.” The “equal work” standard embodies a middle ground between demanding that 
two jobs either be exactly alike or that they merely be comparable. The test applied by the courts 
focuses on job similarity and whether, given all the circumstances, they require substantially the 
same skill, effort, and responsibility. The EPA may be enforced by the government, or individual 
complainants, in civil actions for wages unlawfully withheld and liquidated damages for willful 
violations. In addition, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act provides for the awarding of 
compensatory and punitive damages to victims of “intentional” wage discrimination, subject to 
caps on the employer’s monetary liability. 
The issue of pay equity has attracted substantial attention in recent Congresses. A number of 
measures, including bills that would provide additional remedies, mandate “equal pay for 
equivalent jobs,” or require studies on pay inequity, have been introduced in each of the last 
several congressional sessions. These bills include the Paycheck Fairness Act (H.R. 377/S. 84) 
and the Fair Pay Act (H.R. 438/S. 168) in the 113th Congress. This report also discusses pay 
equity litigation, including Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, a case in which the Supreme Court rejected 
class action status for current and former female Wal-Mart employees who allege that the 
company has engaged in pay discrimination. 
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he persistence of gender-based wage disparities—commonly referred to as the pay or wage 
gap—has been the subject of extensive debate and commentary. Congress first addressed 
the issue more than four decades ago in the Equal Pay Act of 1963,1 mandating an “equal 
pay for equal work” standard, and addressed it again the following year in Title VII of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act.2 Collection of compensation data and elimination of male/female pay disparities 
are also integral to Labor Department enforcement of Executive Order 11246 (initially issued by 
President Lyndon Johnson), which mandates nondiscrimination and affirmative action by federal 
contractors. During the last several decades, initiatives to strengthen and expand current federal 
remedies available to victims of unlawful sex-based wage discrimination have been taken up in 
Congress. 
This report begins by presenting data trends in earnings for male and female workers and by 
discussing explanations that have been offered for the differences in earnings. It next discusses 
the major laws directed at eliminating sex-based wage discrimination as well as relevant federal 
court cases. The report closes with a description of pay equity legislation that has been considered 
or enacted by Congress in recent years. 
Earnings Trends Among Male and Female Workers 
Historical and Recent Data 
This section uses two commonly cited federal data sources to discuss the earnings of full-time 
male and female workers.3 The Census Bureau publishes data on the median annual earnings of 
full-time, year-round workers (i.e., at least 35 hours per week and at least 50 weeks per year). 
These data include workers age 15 and over and are available beginning in 1960. The Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS) publishes data on the median weekly earnings of full-time workers (i.e., at 
least 35 hours per week, including part-year workers). These data include workers age 16 and 
over and are available beginning in 1979. 
Figure 1 uses these two data series to chart median female earnings as a percentage of median 
male earnings. The weekly wage gap has tended to be slightly smaller than the annual wage gap, 
though both have trended similarly. Considerations related to interpreting these data are discussed 
in the next section of this report. 
                                                                 
1 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). 
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. 
3 Comparisons between the earnings of male and female workers are typically limited to full-time workers. Since 
female workers are more likely to work part-time, comparisons that include all workers typically produce a pay gap to 
which a substantial portion is attributable to fewer female workers working full-time. 
T
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Figure 1. Female Earnings as a Percentage of Male Earnings, 1960-2012 
Full-time workers, median annual earnings (red line) and median weekly earnings (black line) 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
19
60
19
65
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
20
10
 
Source: Graph constructed by CRS using data from Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United 
States: 2012, United States Census Bureau, September 2013, Table A-4, http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/
p60-245.pdf and Employment and Earnings, United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table 
37, http://www.bls.gov/opub/ee/2013/cps/annavg37_2012.pdf. 
Notes: Annual earnings data include workers age 15 and over. Weekly earnings data include workers age 16 and 
over. Weekly wage data are not available prior to 1979. 
 
In 2012, the median annual earnings for female workers who worked full-time, year round were 
76.5% of male workers with a similar level of labor force attachment ($49,398 v. $37,791).4 
Using the weekly wage metric, female workers’ median earnings in 2012 were 80.9% of male 
workers’ ($691 v. $854).5 
Another BLS publication estimated the median weekly earnings in 2011 for full-time male and 
female workers in various demographic groups. Some demographic groups had smaller wage 
gaps than the overall working population while others had larger gaps. For example, among 
workers between the ages of 25 and 34, female workers’ earnings were 92.3% of male workers’. 
Conversely, the earnings of all female workers with at least a bachelor’s degree were 74.9% of 
similarly educated male workers.6 
                                                                 
4 United States Census Bureau, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2012, 
September 2013, Table A-4, http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p60-245.pdf. 
5Employment and Earnings, United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table 37, 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/ee/2013/cps/annavg37_2012.pdf. 
6 United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Highlights of Women’s Earnings in 2011, October 
2012, Table 13, http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpswom2011.pdf. 
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Considerations Related to Interpreting Gender Wage Data 
Some have attributed the wage differentials discussed in the prior section to discrimination 
towards female workers. A significant body of research, however, has found that a substantial 
portion of the wage gap can be attributed to non-gender differences between male and female 
workers such as consecutive years in the labor force or the concentration of workers of a single 
gender in certain high- or low-paying occupations. While this body of research suggests that the 
unexplained portion of the wage gap is smaller than the raw wage gap discussed in the prior 
section, there is no broadly accepted methodology that is able to attribute the entirety of the raw 
wage gap to factors other than gender.7 
Typically, studies that examine the wage gap compare the earnings of male and female workers 
while controlling for observable characteristics that may be related to earnings such as education 
and occupation. Most studies also consider hourly wages rather than weekly or annual wages to 
control for variations in the number of hours worked. For example, a frequently cited study by 
Blau and Kahn used data from 1998 to examine hourly wage differences between male and 
female workers while controlling for education, experience, occupation, industry, collective 
bargaining coverage, and other characteristics. When their full model was applied, it estimated an 
unexplained difference of about 9% between the earnings of male and female workers.8 Another 
study, commissioned by the U.S. Department of Labor and using data from 2007, used a different 
data source from Blau and Kahn and controlled for a slightly different set of personal and human 
capital characteristics. It found an unexplained earnings differential of between 5% and 7%.9  
Interpretations of these studies vary. Some view the attribution of substantial portions of the raw 
pay gap to non-gender factors as evidence that, if present at all, discrimination is a minor factor in 
the gender wage gap. Others note that many of the explanatory factors (such as occupation and 
job tenure) could themselves be influenced by discrimination and advocate for further policy 
interventions. 
Legal and Legislative Background 
Laws That Combat Sex-Based Wage Discrimination 
The Equal Pay Act (EPA) is a 1963 amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act that makes it 
illegal to pay different wages to employees of the opposite sex for equal work on jobs the 
performance of which requires “equal skill, effort, and responsibility,” and which are “performed 
under similar working conditions.”10 The act also prohibits labor organizations and their agents 
from causing or attempting to cause sex-based wage discrimination by employers. Specifically 
                                                                 
7 For a summary of some relevant studies, see Natalia Kolesnikova and Yang Liu, “Gender Wage Gap May Be Much 
Smaller Than Most Think,” The Regional Economist, published by the St. Louis Federal Reserve, October 2011, pp. 
14-15, http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/pub_assets/pdf/re/2011/d/gender_wage_gap.pdf. 
8 See Table 2a in Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn, “The U.S. Gender Pay Gap in the 1990s: Slowing 
Convergence,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, vol. 60, no. 1 (October 2006), pp. 45-66. 
9  CONSAD Research Corporation, prepared for the U.S. Department of Labor, An Analysis of the Reasons for the 
Disparity in Wages Between Men and Women, January 2009, http://www.consad.com/content/reports/
Gender%20Wage%20Gap%20Final%20Report.pdf. 
10 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). 
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permitted by the EPA, however, are wage differentials based on seniority systems, merit systems, 
systems that measure earnings by quality or quantity of production, or “any factor other than 
sex.”11 The “equal work” standard embodies a middle ground between demanding that two jobs 
be either exactly alike or that they merely be comparable. The test applied by the courts focuses 
on job similarity and whether, in light of all the circumstances, they require substantially the same 
skill, effort, and responsibility.12 An employer may not attempt to equalize wages to comply with 
the EPA by lowering the rate of pay for any employee.13 
A year after passage of the EPA, Congress enacted the comprehensive code of anti-discrimination 
rules based on race, color, national origin, religion, and sex found in Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act. The EPA and Title VII provide overlapping coverage for claims of sex-based wage 
discrimination, but differ in important substantive, procedural, and remedial aspects. A crucial 
difference is that the “equal work” standard of the EPA—requiring “substantial” identity between 
compared male and female jobs—does not limit an employer’s liability for intentional wage 
discrimination under Title VII. For example, in Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc.,14 the 
plaintiff’s inability to demonstrate that she performed the same work as higher paid males did not 
preclude a Title VII claim based on evidence male employees who performed fewer duties were 
paid more than she, or that the employer would have paid her more had she been a male. Thus, a 
violation of the EPA will generally violate Title VII, but the converse is not true.15 
Additionally, the remedies for violation of the two laws differ. Under the EPA, a prevailing 
plaintiff may obtain backpay for any wages unlawfully withheld as the result of pay inequality 
and twice that amount in liquidated damages for a willful violation. By contrast, the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 added to the backpay remedy authorized by Title VII a provision for jury trials and 
compensatory and punitive damages for victims of “intentional” sex discrimination in wage cases 
and otherwise.16 Such damages may only be recovered, however, in cases of intentional 
discrimination, not in so-called “disparate impact” cases alleging the adverse effect of a facially 
neutral employment practice on a protected group member. In addition, the Title VII damages 
remedy is limited by dollar “caps,” which vary depending on the size of the employer.17 
                                                                 
11 Id. 
12 E.g. EEOC v. Madison Community United School District, 818 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1987)(“equal work” requires a 
substantial identity rather than an absolute identity). 
13 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). 
14 975 F.2d 1518 (11th Cir. 1992). 
15 29 C.F.R. § 1620.27(a). 
16 42 U.S.C. § 1981A. Compensatory damages include “future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, 
inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life and other nonpecuniary losses.” Punitive damages may be 
recovered where the employer acted “with malice or with reckless indifference” to the complaining employee’s 
federally protected rights. 
17 The sum total of compensatory and punitive damages awarded may not exceed $50,000 in the case of an employer 
with more than 14 and fewer than 101 employees; $100,000 in the case of an employer with more than 100 and fewer 
than 201 employees; $200,000 in the case of an employer with more than 200 and fewer than 500 employees; and 
$300,000 in the case of an employer with more than 500 employees. 
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The Ledbetter Case and Subsequent Legislation 
In 2007, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc.,18 
a case in which the female plaintiff alleged that past sex discrimination had resulted in lower pay 
increases and that these past pay decisions continued to affect the amount of her pay throughout 
her employment, resulting in a significant pay disparity between her and her male colleagues by 
the end of her nearly 20-year career. Under Title VII, plaintiffs are required to file suit within 180 
days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.”19 Although the plaintiff argued 
that each paycheck she received constituted a new violation of the statute and therefore reset the 
clock with regard to filing a claim, the Court rejected this argument, reasoning that “a new 
violation does not occur, and a new charging period does not commence, upon the occurrence of 
subsequent nondiscriminatory acts that entail adverse effects resulting from the past 
discrimination.”20 As a result, the Court held that the plaintiff had not filed suit in a timely 
manner. Initially, the decision appeared to limit some pay discrimination claims based on Title 
VII, but did not affect an individual’s ability to sue for sex discrimination that results in pay bias 
under the Equal Pay Act, which does not contain the 180-day filing deadline.  
Although the Court’s decision made it more difficult for employees to sue for pay discrimination 
under Title VII, the ruling was subsequently superseded by the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 
2009, which amended Title VII to clarify that the time limit for suing employers for pay 
discrimination begins each time they issue a paycheck and is not limited to the original 
discriminatory action.21 This change is applicable not only to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, but 
also to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).22 
The Wal-Mart Case 
In 2004, a federal district court permitted to proceed a class action on behalf of more than 1.5 
million current and former female employees of Wal-Mart retail stores nationwide. In Dukes et al. 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,23 the plaintiffs claim that women over the past five years have been paid 
less than male workers in comparable positions and that the company systematically passed over 
female employees when awarding promotions to management. According to two studies 
conducted by a sociologist and a statistician for the plaintiffs, 65% of Wal-Mart’s hourly 
employees were women, but women made up only 33% of all management positions. The gender 
gap was even more striking when employment categories were further broken down; while the 
vast majority of Wal-Mart’s cashiers were women, only a small fraction were store managers, the 
top in-store management position. The studies also found that women employed on a full-time 
hourly basis earned less per year on average than their male counterparts, and the shortfall was 
substantial for female store managers. 
                                                                 
18 550 U.S. 618 (2007). 
19 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
20 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007). 
21 P.L. 111-2. 
22 For more information on the Ledbetter decision and subsequent legislation, see CRS Report RS22686, Pay 
Discrimination Claims Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act: A Legal Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Decision in 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., by Jody Feder. 
23 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D.Cal. 2004). 
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At this initial stage, the district court considered only whether the evidence raised issues of law 
and fact common to all members of the proposed class sufficient for a class action to proceed 
under federal law. The court did not decide the merits of plaintiffs’ discrimination claims or any 
issue of Wal-Mart liability. In its opinion, however, the court noted: 
Plaintiffs present largely uncontested descriptive statistics which show that women working 
at Wal-Mart stores are paid less than men in every region, that pay disparities exist in most 
job categories, that the salary gap widens over time, that women take longer to enter 
management positions, and that the higher one looks in the organization the lower the 
percentage of women.24 
Wal-Mart argued that any disparities were the result of decentralized decision-making at the 
regional and local level, not the result of any systematic employer bias, and that a massive class-
action would be too large to administer. The court rejected that argument, however, noting that 
Title VII “contains no special exception for large employers.” Moreover, “[i]nsulating our 
nation’s largest employers from allegations that they have engaged in a pattern or practice of 
gender or racial discrimination—simply because they are large—would seriously undermine 
these imperatives.”25 Thus, any “inference” of discrimination in company compensation and 
promotion policies was found to “affect all plaintiffs in a common manner,” and warranted the 
requested class certification.26 
Wal-Mart appealed the district court’s class action certification, and a three-judge panel of the 
appellate court upheld the class action certification,27 as did a subsequent ruling by a divided 
panel of appellate judges sitting en banc.28 In a 5-4 decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, however, the 
Supreme Court recently reversed the class certification ruling.29  
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, parties seeking class certification must show, among 
other things, that 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are 
questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative 
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties 
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.30 
According to the Court, the Dukes plaintiffs failed to meet the commonality requirement because 
they could not establish that Wal-Mart operated under a common, general policy of 
discrimination. Rather: 
The only corporate policy that the plaintiffs’ evidence convincingly establishes is Wal-
Mart’s “policy” of allowing discretion by local supervisors over employment matters. On its 
                                                                 
24 Id. at 155. 
25 Id. at 142. 
26 Id. at 166. 
27 Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007). 
28 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010). 
29 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). The Court also unanimously held that claims for monetary relief may not be certified 
pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), unless the monetary relief is incidental to the injunctive or declaratory relief. Id. at 2557. 
30 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). 
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face, of course, that is just the opposite of a uniform employment practice that would provide 
the commonality needed for a class action.31 
In its ruling, the Court emphasized that plaintiffs must provide “significant proof” that a “specific 
employment practice” led to the discrimination, and rejected as insufficient statistical and 
anecdotal evidence offered by the plaintiffs.32 Although the Court’s decision makes it more 
difficult for employees to receive class certification and thus makes it less likely that large 
employers will face similar suits in the future, it is not necessarily the end of the litigation. 
Plaintiffs may still pursue their claims as individuals, or perhaps as part of a smaller class.  
Indeed, approximately 2,000 claimants filed individual charges with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within a year of the Dukes decision,33 while others have filed 
new class action lawsuits that limit claims to stores located in a specified region, such as a single 
state. These states include California, Texas, Tennessee, and Florida.34 These lawsuits, however, 
have not met with much success. In the California case, for example, the district court recently 
denied the plaintiffs’ request for certification of a class consisting of 150,000 women working in 
Wal-Mart’s California stores. According to the court, the “newly proposed class continues to 
suffer from the problems that foreclosed certification of the nationwide class.”35 Meanwhile, the 
plaintiffs who refiled complaints against Wal-Mart in Texas, Tennessee, and Florida have had 
their requests for class certification dismissed as time-barred under the statute of limitations,36 
although some of these decisions have been appealed. Because the statute of limitations is tolled 
for individual claims, these rulings do not preclude the original Dukes plaintiffs from filing 
individual claims, nor do they prevent new plaintiffs with fresh claims from filing class action 
lawsuits against the company in the future. 
Ultimately, if any of the claims against Wal-Mart go to trial, the female plaintiffs carry the burden 
of proving that the company engaged in an intentional pattern and practice of discriminating in 
pay and promotions. The record to date suggests that this may be no easy task, in part due to 
subjectivity in the company’s personnel procedures and the fact that, prior to January 2003, the 
company apparently failed to post or document most available promotion opportunities.37 There 
may be limited data on how many employees, male or female, applied for most of these positions. 
But if they prevail, whether at trial or by settlement, substantial monetary damages may be 
available to members of the plaintiff class under Title VII. 
Prior to the Court’s decision in Dukes, other large corporations that had been sued for pay 
discrimination had a tendency to enter into settlement agreements. For example, the investment 
firm Morgan Stanley reportedly agreed to pay $54 million to settle government claims that it 
systematically underpaid and failed to promote its women executives. Allegations of sexual 
harassment were also involved in the case. Beyond $12 million set aside to pay the lead plaintiff, 
                                                                 
31 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554. 
32 Id. at 2553-56. 
33 Steve Painter, “Arkansas Democrat-Gazette,” June 13, 2012. 
34 Ariel Barkhurst, “Women Sue Wal-Mart for Discrimination,” Sun-Sentinel, October 5, 2012, p. 1D. 
35 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109106 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2013). 
36 Love v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143234 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2013); Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 875 (M.D. Tenn. 2013); Odle v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159351 (N.D. 
Tex. Oct. 15, 2012). 
37 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 149. 
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a consent decree provides $40 million for any of about 340 other potential discrimination victims 
who are able to prove their claims, and another $2 million to establish internal anti-discrimination 
programs. For a period of three years, the decree required appointment of a firm ombudsman for 
sex discrimination issues and of an external monitor to review Morgan Stanley’s adherence to the 
settlement and its progress at preventing discrimination.38 Shortly after settlement in the Morgan 
Stanley case, both Boeing and Citigroup agreed to settle similar pay equity lawsuits, and Costco 
was sued for similar reasons.39  
In contrast to the above corporations, Costco has chosen to defend itself in court. Although a 
federal district court granted class-action status to the plaintiffs in Ellis v. Costco Wholesale 
Corp.,40 a federal appeals court subsequently vacated the district court’s ruling regarding 
commonality and, specifically noting the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 
remanded the case for reconsideration and application of the proper legal standard for evaluating 
commonality.41 Despite the more stringent post-Dukes standards for class action certification, the 
district court ruled in favor of the Costco plaintiffs on remand.42 In its decision, the court 
distinguished the facts in the case from those in the Dukes lawsuit, noting that the discrimination 
claims were limited to a much smaller number of plaintiffs seeking specific management 
positions, that the promotion process was controlled by central management, and that the 
plaintiffs had identified this process as the specific employment practice that was subject to 
challenge. According to the court, “[i]t is this ‘common direction’ and the identification of 
specific practices ..., in addition to the smaller size and scope of the class, that separates this case 
from Dukes.”43 Thus, the court held that the Costco plaintiffs had demonstrated sufficient 
commonality to warrant class action status. 
Recent Legislation 
Although the Ledbetter legislation discussed above is the only new pay discrimination law 
enacted by Congress in recent years, the issue of pay equity continues to garner congressional 
attention. Indeed, a number of measures have been introduced repeatedly in each of the last 
several congressional sessions. The two most prominent of these are the Paycheck Fairness Act 
and the Fair Pay Act, both of which are described below. 
Paycheck Fairness Act 
Introduced in each of the last several congressional sessions, the Paycheck Fairness Act (H.R. 
377/S. 84 in the 113th Congress) would increase penalties for employers who pay different wages 
to men and women for “equal work,” and would add programs for training, research, technical 
assistance, and pay equity employer recognition awards. The legislation would also make it more 
                                                                 
38 Brooke A. Masters, “Wall Street Sex-Bias Case Settled; Morgan Stanley Agrees to Pay $54 Million,” Washington 
Post, July 13, 2004, at E01. 
39 Brooke A. Masters and Amy Joyce, “Costco is the Latest Class-Action Target; Lawyers’ Interest Increases in 
Potentially Lucrative Discrimination Suits,” Washington Post, August 18, 2004, at A01. 
40 240 F.R.D. 627 (D. Cal. 2007). 
41 Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. Cal. 2011). 
42 Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 285 F.R.D. 492 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
43 Id. at 509. 
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difficult for employers to avoid EPA liability, and proposed safeguards would protect employees 
from retaliation for making inquiries or disclosures concerning employee wages and for filing a 
charge or participating in any manner in EPA proceedings. In short, while this legislation would 
adhere to current equal work standards of the EPA, it would reform the procedures and remedies 
for enforcing the law.  
Under the EPA, as noted, prevailing plaintiffs may recover backpay in an amount equal to the 
total difference between wages actually received and those to which they are lawfully entitled and 
an additional amount equal to the backpay award as liquidated damages.44 Compensatory 
damages are not authorized, and consequently, awards do not include sums for physical or mental 
distress, medical expenses, or other costs.45 The Paycheck Fairness Act would authorize EPA 
class actions and “such compensatory and punitive damages as may be appropriate.” In addition, 
the legislation would establish more restrictive standards for proof by employers of an affirmative 
defense to EPA liability based on any “bona fide factor other than sex.” Thus, for a pay factor to 
be “bona fide,” the employer would have to establish that it was “job related,” consistent with 
“business necessity,” and not derived from a sex-based differential in compensation, and that the 
employer’s purpose could not be accomplished by less discriminatory alternative means. 
Another aspect of EPA enforcement addressed by proposed pay equity bills concerns employer 
recordkeeping and the conduct of technical assistance, research, and educational programs by 
federal agencies. For example, the Paycheck Fairness Act would mandate record-keeping and 
data collection for better enforcement of the law. The measure would direct the EEOC to survey 
data currently available to the government and, in consultation with sister agencies, to identify 
additional sources of pay information that may be marshaled to support federal anti-
discrimination efforts. The EEOC would be required to issue regulations for the collection of pay 
data from employers based on sex, race, and ethnicity, taking into consideration the burden placed 
on employers and the need to protect the confidentiality of required reports. In addition, the 
Secretary of Labor would be directed to develop job evaluation guidelines based on objective 
factors of education, skill, independence, and decision-making responsibility for voluntary use by 
employers in eliminating unfair pay disparities between traditionally male- and female-dominated 
occupations. Technical assistance and a recognition program would be awarded to employers who 
voluntarily adjust their wage scales pursuant to such a job evaluation. Finally, a “National Award 
for Pay Equity in the Workplace” would be established to recognize employers who demonstrate 
“substantial effort to eliminate pay disparities between men and women.” 
Fair Pay Act 
The Fair Pay Act (H.R. 438/S. 168 in the 113th Congress), which has predecessors dating back to 
the 103rd Congress, would go further than the Paycheck Fairness Act by proposing a fundamental 
expansion to the scope of the EPA, which is presently confined to sex-based wage differentials, 
by adding racial and ethnic minorities as protected classes under that law. Intentional wage 
discrimination against these groups is already prohibited by Title VII. But Title VII and the EPA 
have different standards of proof, and because proof of intent to discriminate is not required by 
the “equal pay for equal work” standard of the EPA,46 it may provide greater protection to 
                                                                 
44 29 U.S.C. §§ 216-17. 
45 E.g. Hybki v. Alexander & Alexander, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 483 (W.D.Mo. 1982) (emphasizing damages for pain and 
suffering are not available under the EPA). 
46 See Fallon v. State of Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206 (7th Cir. 1989). 
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minority groups than Title VII in many cases. The EPA’s catchall exception, affording employers 
broad immunity for pay differentials attributable to “factors other than sex,” would be 
significantly narrowed by the Fair Pay Act. A compensatory and punitive damages remedy, 
without statutory limit, would replace the present EPA backpay and liquidated damages scheme, 
based on the Fair Labor Standards Act. 
Significantly, the Fair Pay Act would also redefine the basic statutory standard of the EPA by 
requiring employers to pay equal wages regardless of sex, race, or national origin to workers in 
“equivalent jobs.” Unlike the current law, Equal Pay Act claims based on wage disparities 
between dissimilar jobs—for example, a janitor and a clerk—would be permitted if they are 
determined to be “equivalent” in some largely undefined manner. By substituting job equivalency 
for the “equal work standard” in the EPA, the Fair Pay Act arguably could revive legal issues 
similar to those confronted by the federal courts during the 1980s in so-called “comparable 
worth” Title VII cases.47 
Finally, the Fair Pay Act would require all covered employers to maintain comprehensive records 
of “the method, system, calculations, and other bases used” to set employee wages and to file 
annual reports with the EEOC detailing the racial, ethnic, and gender composition of the 
employer’s workforce broken down by job classification and wage or salary level. Such reports 
would be available for “reasonable” inspection and examination upon request of any person, 
pursuant to EEOC regulations, and could be used by the Commission for such “statistical and 
research purposes ... as it may deem appropriate.” The EEOC would also be required to “carry on 
a continuing program of research, education, and technical assistance” to implement the proposed 
ban on racial, ethnic, or gender discrimination between employees working “in equivalent jobs.” 
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47 During the 1980s, some litigants tried to substitute job equivalency for the “equal work standard” in the EPA through 
so-called “comparable worth” Title VII cases. Under the comparable worth principle, whole classes of jobs are 
undervalued because they traditionally have been predominately held by women. Because of alleged labor market bias 
against female-dominated jobs, Title VII plaintiffs contended that pay discrimination claims should not be limited by 
the EPA standard, requiring that jobs be substantially “equal” or similar for different pay rates to be considered 
discriminatory. Instead, Title VII wage-based discrimination actions against employers could be predicated on job 
evaluation studies, they argued, which compared the value of women’s jobs to those of men who perform work that is 
dissimilar, but of equivalent or comparable worth to the employer. The courts, however, were not receptive to the 
comparable worth argument. See AFSCME v. State of Washington 770 F. 2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985). See also, American 
Nurses Ass’n v. State of Illinois, 606 F. Supp. 1313 (N.D.Ill. 1985) (Congress never intended to incorporate a 
comparable worth standard in Title VII and such a concept is neither sound nor workable). 
 
